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Abstract
This note analyses the adoption and di⁄usion of innovations in a hori-
zontally di⁄erentiated Cournot duopoly in which ￿rms have to choose
the dates for adopting a cost-reducing new technology like in Rein-
ganum (1981a). We prove that product di⁄erentiation crucially mat-
ters in the di⁄usion pattern of the innovation and in the comparison
between the adoption timing in the decentralized economy Vs the so-
cial optimum.
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Technology adoption is nowadays considered as a key factor explaining dif-
ferences in productivity at all levels. Just like the capacity to innovate, the
ability of industries to adopt new and more e¢ cient technologies is a decisive
determinant of their viability. A salient feature of the adoption patterns is
the so-called technological di⁄usion, namely the sequential adoption of inno-
vations by ￿rms. This feature has been intensively studied in all the ￿elds
of economic theory, and several arguments have been put forward to explain
the sequentiality of adoption. Among them, the strategic arguments have
become increasingly popular. Reinganum (1981a, 1981b) are the seminal pa-
pers in this area. In the ￿rst paper, the author develops a game-theoretic
approach to di⁄usion: In a duopoly where each ￿rm must determine when to
adopt (if ever) a cost-reducing innovation, she shows that even in the case of
identical ￿rms and complete certainty, two asymmetric Nash equilibria arise
in pure strategy, one ￿rm adopting relatively earlier, the other relatively later,
that is di⁄usion occurs. In the second paper, Reinganum extends her results
to the oligopoly case, which allows her to characterize explicitly the e⁄ects
of market structure (as captured by the number of ￿rms) on the di⁄usion
patterns. In a subsequent development based on Reinganum (1981a, 1981b),
Quirmbach (1986) compares di⁄usion rates for di⁄erent market structures in
the capital equipment market.
In this note, we use the framework of Reinganum (1981a) to analyse the
impact of product di⁄erentiation on the timing of adoption. Our analysis
is based on a horizontally di⁄erentiated duopoly with Cournot competition.
There is an obvious motivation behind the extension of Reinganum￿ s strategic
set-up: The degree of di⁄erentiation of the produced goods is inversely related
to competition toughness, and the latter is likely to play a central role in the
adoption sequence since it in￿ uences a ￿rm￿ s pre-adoption pro￿ts as well as
its post adoption pro￿ts. Therefore, our framework is a natural one to study
the interaction between competition in the product market and technological
di⁄usion.
We shall show that the degree of product di⁄erentiation has some crucial
consequences on the adoption patterns either in the decentralized equilib-
rium or in the social planner problem￿ s outcomes. The most striking results
are twofold. First, we identify an inversely U ￿ shaped relationship between
the ￿rst adoption and competition toughness in the product market, which is
in sharp contrast for example to G￿tz (1999) who shows that increased com-
1petition often fastens di⁄usion in a market with monopolistic competition.
Second, we show that while the ￿rst adoption is always delayed in the decen-
tralized economy compared to the second best, full adoption (i.e. adoption
by both ￿rms) crucially depends on the degree of product di⁄erentiation. In
particular, we prove that full adoption occurs earlier in the second best if the
products are di⁄erentiated enough.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives the basic set-up. Sec-
tion 3 derives the adoption decisions in the decentralized Vs second-best
equilibria. Section 4 and 5 compare the outcomes of both equilibria in terms
of technological di⁄usion and connect them with the underlying competition
toughness in the product market.
2 The basic set up
The demand side is a simpli￿ed version of Singh and Vives (1984). Firm
i, for i = f1;2g, produces a di⁄erentiated product, qi, and sells it at price
pi. The demand functions for the di⁄erentiated products are assumed to
be generated by a representative consumer with a quadratic utility function
U(q1;q2) = ￿(q1 + q2) ￿ 1
2 (q2
1 + 2￿q1q2 + q2
2), with ￿ > 0 and ￿ 2 (0;1]. The
parameter ￿ indicates the strength of product di⁄erentiation: in the limit
case ￿ = 1, both products are perfect substitutes; instead, as ￿ approaches
zero, products become more di⁄erentiated. Maximizing consumers￿utility
yields the linear inverse demand schedule:
pi = ￿ ￿ qi ￿ ￿qj,
with i, j = f1;2g and i 6= j.
The two ￿rms start with the same constant marginal cost c < ￿. At
time t = 0, a new technology becomes available and its adoption reduces
marginal costs to c￿", with " 2 (0;c). Firms decide on whether and when to
adopt the new technology. At the status quo, (pre-innovation) instantaneous
pro￿ts are denoted by ￿ > 0. When the innovation is adopted, adopter￿ s
pro￿ts (excluding adoption costs) become ￿a(s), depending on the number of
adopters s = f1;2g, and non adopter￿ s pro￿ts become ￿n(s), with s = f0;1g.
Naturally, ￿ = ￿n(0). In the following, let us assume that innovations are
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; as shown below, under non drastic
2innovations non adopters are always optimally operative.1
In Cournot competition, ￿rms choose output in order to maximize their
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Observe that adoption by one ￿rm has a negative impact on the pro￿ts
of the other ￿rm (business stealing e⁄ect). Now, to simplify the exposition
of the main results, we introduce the following notation:
i) ￿1 = ￿a(1) ￿ ￿ representing the initial gain of the ￿rst adopter;
ii) ￿2 = ￿a(2) ￿ ￿n(1) representing the gain of the second adopter;
iii) ￿3 = ￿￿￿n(1) representing the pro￿t decrease of the second adopter
after the ￿rst adoption;
iv) ￿4 = ￿a(1)￿￿a(2) representing the pro￿t decrease of the ￿rst adopter
after the second adoption.
Demand and cost speci￿cations in this paper satisfy Assumptions 1-3
in Reinganum (1981a). Consequently, ￿rms have incentives to preemptive
adoption, since the gain induced by the ￿rst adoption is larger than the gain
induced by the second adoption, or:
￿1 > ￿2. (Property 1)
1If the innovation were drastic, i.e. if " >
2￿￿
￿ (￿ ￿ c), the reaction functions of the
adopter and the non adopter never cross, implying that the non adopter optimally shuts
down at the time of adoption, and the adopter becomes a monopolist. The main results
of this paper do not change under drastic innovations.
3As outlined by Quirmbach (1986, Proposition 1, p. 35), this represents a nec-
essary condition for di⁄usion. By rearranging terms in ￿1 and ￿2, Property
1 can be also written as:
￿4 > ￿3, (Property 2)
i.e. the loss in terms of pro￿ts of the ￿rst adopter after the second adoption is
larger than the one induced by the ￿rst adoption on the pro￿ts of the second
adopter.
3 Adoption
The setting of the adoption game is close to Reinganum (1981a). Let X(T)
denote the undiscounted cost of adoption, i.e. the cost of bringing the new
technology on line by date T. It is assumed that X0(T) < 0 and X00(T) > 0,
i.e. adoption costs decrease with the time elapsed until adoption, but at a
declining rate. Moreover, X(0) is assumed to be su¢ ciently large so that an
initial adoption appears unattractive and limt!1 X(T) = 0, implying that
adoption will eventually occur. At date T = 0, ￿rms must simultaneously
precommit to an adoption date.2
In the next two subsections, we derive the noncooperative and the second
best solutions of the model.
3.1 The noncooperative equilibrium of the model
Firm i maximizes the discounted value of total pro￿ts ￿i(Ti;Tj) by choosing


























￿rT2 if T2 5 T1;
2This corresponds to assume in￿nitely long information lags or, technically, an open￿
loop information structure. In other words, a ￿rm is not allowed to react to its rival￿ s action
during the game. The case without precommitment was introduced to the literature by
Fudenberg and Tirole (1985). They show that a ￿rst-mover advantage will stimulate
preemptive adoption until ￿rms￿payo⁄s are equalized if ￿rms are unable to precommit to
future actions (closed ￿ loop information structure).
4where r is the market interest rate. The payo⁄ of ￿rm 2 is:
￿2(T1;T2) = ￿1(T2;T1):
As shown by Reinganum (1981a, Assumption 5a), if ￿2 < ￿X0(0), this
duopoly game presents two Nash equilibria in pure strategies, with 0 ￿ ^ T1 <
^ T2 or 0 ￿ ^ T2 < ^ T1, where ^ Ti refers to ￿rm i￿ s optimal choice. This has two
implications. Firstly, the di⁄usion of technologies is never instantaneous.
Secondly, regardless of the fact that ￿rms are identical, they never adopt
the new technology at the same date. Observe that the analysis is restricted
to the case of gross substitutability, i.e. ￿ 2 (0;1]. In the case of gross
complementarity, i.e. ￿ 2 (￿1;0), Properties 1 and 2 are violated implying
simultaneous adoption.
Since ￿rms are identical, without loss of generality, we can assume that
￿rm 1 adopts ￿rst; this means that ^ T1 < ^ T2. The optimization problems are
the following:
^ T1 = argmax
T1
￿1(T1;T2);
^ T2 = argmax
T2
￿2(T1;T2).
In other words, the objective of each ￿rm is to choose an adoption date so
as to maximize its discounted payo⁄, taking the choice of the other ￿rm






Equations (1) and (2) state that the optimal adoption date equalizes the
￿rm￿ s bene￿ts from adoption to the the marginal cost of waiting. Given that
function X0(^ Ti) is increasing in ^ Ti and from Property 1, ^ T1 < ^ T2. Since ￿1
is a function of ￿, we can study the way in which product di⁄erentiation
in￿ uences the incentives and the timing of the ￿rst adoption. We state the
following proposition:
3The second order conditions are satis￿ed since ￿rm i￿ s objective function is concave
in variable Ti.
5Proposition 1 The relation between the adoption date ^ T1 and the degree of
product di⁄erentiation is U ￿ shaped.





￿X00( ^ T1). Since the denominator of the
previous ratio is negative,
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Since ￿rms receive maximal (monopoly) pro￿ts when they produce inde-
pendent products and obtain minimal ones if the good is homogeneous, the
degree of product di⁄erentiation can be interpreted as inversely related to the
degree of competition. Therefore, according to Proposition 1, competition
toughness stimulates di⁄usion when products are substitute enough. Note
that G￿tz (1999, pp. 689-691) obtains that increased competition promotes
di⁄usion by means of a numerical simulation in a model of technological
adoption with monopolistic competition. Instead, Proposition 1 suggests
that in a di⁄erentiated duopoly the relation between the optimal timing of
the ￿rst adopter and competition toughness is inversely U ￿ shaped. The
reason of this non-monotonicity relies on the fact that product di⁄erentia-
tion in￿ uences the incentive to adopt, ￿1, by changing both pre-innovation
pro￿ts ￿ and post-innovation pro￿ts ￿a(1); in fact, an increase in ￿ exerts a
negative e⁄ect on ￿ and two opposite e⁄ects on ￿a(1). More precisely, the
adverse e⁄ect on ￿ and ￿a(1) is due to the fact that a reduction in the degree
of product di⁄erentiation decreases pro￿ts (usual competition e⁄ect); how-
ever, there is an additional (positive) e⁄ect on ￿a(1) since the ￿rst adopter
is able to exploit more its cost advantage by discouraging the rival￿ s produc-
tion when competition is tougher. The obtained non-monotonic relationship
is the result of these three e⁄ects. When ￿ is lower than ￿ ￿, an increase in ￿
reduces ￿a(1) more than ￿ meaning that ￿1 becomes smaller; the converse
happens when ￿ is higher than ￿ ￿.
We shall discuss the e⁄ects of product di⁄erentiation on the full adoption
process in Sections 4 and 5.
63.2 The welfare analysis
Now, we turn to welfare analysis in order to compute adoption timings in the
second best framework. Because we focus on the optimal di⁄usion pattern,
we assume that the social planner is unable to in￿ uence the pricing behaviour


















C = (1 + ￿)￿,
C(1) = ￿a(1)=2 + ￿n(1)=2 + ￿
p
￿a(1) ￿ ￿n(1),
C(2) = (1 + ￿)￿a(2),
represent the consumer surplus4 when the number of adopters is zero, one
and two, respectively.
The second best adoption dates result from maximizing W (T1;T2) with
respect to T1 and T2; the ￿rst order conditions are:
￿1 ￿ ￿3 + C(1) ￿ C = ￿X
0(~ T1), (3)
￿2 ￿ ￿4 + C(2) ￿ C(1) = ￿X
0(~ T2). (4)
Equation (3) states that the optimal choice of ~ T1 equalizes the social bene￿t5
of the ￿rst adoption to the marginal cost of postponing. A similar interpre-
tation can be given to equation (4) for the second adoption date ~ T2.
4 Timing of adoption in decentralized Vs sec-
ond best equilibria
In this section we turn to the question of how the timing of adoption in a
decentralized economy di⁄ers from the second best. A similar issue has been
4Consumer surplus is equal to U(q1;q2) ￿ p1q1 ￿ p2q2 = q2
1=2 + q2
2=2 + ￿q1q2.
5For instance, in a social welfare analysis, the bene￿t of the ￿rst adoption is equal to
the net gain of being ￿rst, ￿1 ￿ ￿3 (look at Property 1), and the change in consumer
surplus, C(1) ￿ C.
7tackled by Quirmbach (1986) in the case of homogenous products. In the
noncooperative equilibrium, adoption decisions are taken by ￿rms. For this
reason, optimal conditions (1) and (2) only consider gains of the adopters, ￿1
and ￿2. In contrast, the second best rules, also take into account the gains
and losses of the other market agents, i.e., the other ￿rm and consumers.
Losses of the non adopter at the time of the ￿rst adoption are given by ￿3
and losses of the ￿rst adopter at the time of the second adoption are given
by ￿4. Consumers￿gains are given by the di⁄erences C(1) ￿ C > 0 at the
time of the ￿rst adoption and C(2) ￿ C(1) > 0 at the time of the second
adoption. This implies that for comparing the decentralized solution to the
second best solution, we can simply look at the sign of [C(1) ￿ C ￿ ￿3] and
[C(2) ￿ C(1) ￿ ￿4]. The comparisons between equations (1) and (3), and
between equations (2) and (4) give the following results:
Proposition 2 i) In the market economy, the new technology is introduced
by the ￿rst adopter later than in the second best; that is:
^ T1 > ~ T1 for all ￿ 2 (0;1].
ii) Full adoption (by ￿rm 2) happens earlier in the second best than in the
decentralized economy if the products are su¢ ciently di⁄erentiated. More
precisely:
^ T2 > ~ T2 if and only if ￿ < ￿
￿ =
￿ ￿ c + "=2
￿ ￿ c + "
.
Proof. We are interested in determining the sign of [C(1) ￿ C ￿ ￿3] and
[C(2) ￿ C(1) ￿ ￿4]; at this regard, we get that:
[C(1) ￿ C ￿ ￿3] =
"[2(1 ￿ ￿)(￿ ￿ c) + "]
2(4 ￿ ￿2)
,
[C(2) ￿ C(1) ￿ ￿4] =
"[2(1 ￿ ￿)(￿ ￿ c) + (1 ￿ 2￿)"]
2(4 ￿ ￿2)
.
Observe that [C(1) ￿ C ￿ ￿3] > 0 for all ￿ 2 (0;1]; this means that, for
the ￿rst adoption, there are larger incentives to adopt in the second best
than the decentralized economy. Instead, the sign of [C(2) ￿ C(1) ￿ ￿4] is
ambiguous; it can be positive or negative depending on the values of ￿. Now,
if both products are almost independent, i.e. ￿ = ￿, where ￿ > 0 but very
8small, then ￿3 and ￿4 are close to 0; in fact, each ￿rm behaves as a mo-
nopolist and its pro￿ts do not depend on the adoption decisions of the other
￿rm. Since the consumers always pro￿t from any improvement in technology,
C(2) ￿ C(1) is strictly positive; by continuity, when ￿ is close to 0, we have
[C(2) ￿ C(1) ￿ ￿4] > 0. Moreover, @ [C(2) ￿ C(1) ￿ ￿4]=@￿ < 0 for all
￿ 2 (0;1]; that is, [C(2) ￿ C(1) ￿ ￿4] decreases in ￿. To complete the proof
we need to show that [C(2) ￿ C(1) ￿ ￿4] < 0 when ￿ is su¢ ciently large.
This is simple to check; for instance, consider the other extreme situation of
perfect substitution, i.e. ￿ = 1. In such a case, [C(2) ￿ C(1) ￿ ￿4] equals
￿"2=6. We conclude that there exists a critical value of ￿, denoted as ￿￿,
such that the term [C(2) ￿ C(1) ￿ ￿4] is positive (negative) when ￿ is lower
(higher) than ￿￿.
Therefore, whatever ￿ is, the ￿rst adoption is always delayed in the de-
centralized economy. This is not always true for the full adoption since in
this case the degree of product di⁄erentiation matters.
5 The di⁄usion delay
In this section we focus on the di⁄usion delay that is the time elapsed between
the two dates of adoption. At this regard, in the noncooperative equilibrium
consider the following function:
Z
￿











^ T1; ^ T2
￿
=@ ^ T1 < 0 and @Z
￿
^ T1; ^ T2
￿
=@ ^ T2 > 0; this implies that the
function Z
￿
^ T1; ^ T2
￿
is increasing in the di⁄usion delay. Now, an increase
on the r.h.s. of (5) requires a decrease in ^ T1, an increase in ^ T2 or both.
Therefore, the larger the ratio ￿1=￿2 is, the longer the di⁄usion delay is.
Similarly, in the second best economy we have:
Z
￿






[￿1 ￿ ￿3 + C(1) ￿ C]




~ T1; ~ T2
￿
=@ ~ T1 < 0 and @Z
￿
~ T1; ~ T2
￿
=@ ~ T2 > 0. The di⁄usion delay
depends positively on the r.h.s. of (6).
9Using (5) and (6), we get the following results:
Proposition 3 i) The di⁄usion delay in the decentralized economy (and in
the second best solution) is shorter when the degree of product di⁄erentiation
in duopoly is higher;
ii) The di⁄usion delay is longer in the second-best solution than in the
market economy.
Proof. To show that di⁄usion is lower in a more di⁄erentiated duopoly
market, observe that in a decentralized economy di⁄usion depends on the
ratio ￿1=￿2. By Property 1, we know that ￿1=￿2 > 1, implying that
^ T2 > ^ T1. Now, with almost independent products, i.e. ￿ = ￿, where ￿ > 0
but very small, the ratio ￿1=￿2 is close to 1. Moreover, we have that ￿1=￿2
increases in ￿; in fact, @ (￿1=￿2)=@￿ > 0 for all ￿ 2 (0;1]. This means that
￿1=￿2 assumes the maximum value when products are perfectly substitute,
i.e. ￿ = 1; in such a case, ￿1=￿2 tends to be (￿ ￿ c + ")=(￿ ￿ c) (that is
larger than 1). Similar arguments could be used to show that this result
holds also in the second-best solution.
Finally, comparing (5) and (6) and after some algebra, we have that
[￿1 ￿ ￿3 + C(1) ￿ C]=[￿2 ￿ ￿4 + C(2) ￿ C(1)] > ￿1=￿2 holds for all ￿ 2
(0;1]. This implies a longer di⁄usion delay in the second-best solution than
in the market economy.
We conclude that higher product di⁄erentiation reduces the di⁄usion de-
lay or, similarly, the time elapsed between the ￿rst and second adoption is
longer in a duopoly with a higher degree of competition. This result is in
accordance with G￿tz (1999, p. 690) who shows that an increasing degree
of competitiveness in monopolistic competition leads to an expansion of the
di⁄usion process.
Moreover, once adopted, the di⁄usion delay is shorter in the decentralized
economy. In e⁄ect, since the social planner also takes into account the pro￿t
decrease of the ￿rst adopter induced by full adoption (which according to
Property 2 is larger than the loss in terms of pro￿ts induced by the ￿rst
adoption on the second adopter), he does provide more protection to the
￿rst adopter than the market solution. As a consequence, the time elapsed
between the two adoptions is lengthened by the social planner compared to
the decentralized economy￿ s timing.
106 Conclusion
In this note, we have extend Reinganum￿ s seminal framework (1981a) to
account for product di⁄erentiation. We show that adding this dimension
enriches markedly the discussion around technological di⁄usion and com-
petition toughness. In particular, we show that the relationship between
competition toughness and di⁄usion is U ￿ shaped, and that the compari-
son between adoption patterns in the decentralized Vs second-best equilibria
tightly depends on the degree of product di⁄erentiation. These results are
obtained for linear demand functions, and more importantly, in the duopoly
case. The oligopoly case is in our agenda.
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